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This paper explores the idea that emotions in social contexts and their intentionality may
be conceived of as pragmatic or epistemic actions. That is, emotions are often aimed at
achieving certain goals within a social context, so that they resemble pragmatic actions;
and in other cases emotions can be plausibly construed as acts of probing the social
environment so as to extract or uncover important information, thus complying with the
functions of epistemic actions (cf. Kirsh and Maglio, 1994). This view of emotions stands
at odds with the wide-held conception that emotions’ intentionality can be cashed out in
terms of representations of value. On such a position, emotions’ intentionality has only a
mind-to-world direction of fit while any world-to-mind direction of fit is deemed secondary
or is even outrightly denied. However, acknowledging that emotions (qua actions) also
have a world-to-mind direction fit has several advantages over the typical rendition
of emotions as representations of value, such as accounting for emotions’ sensitivity
to contextual factors, variations in emotion expression and, importantly, assessing the
appropriateness of emotional reactions. To substantiate this claim, several cases of
emotions in social contexts are discussed, as the social dimension of emotions highlights
that emotions are inherently ways of interacting with one’s social environment. In sum,
the construal of emotions in social contexts as pragmatic or epistemic actions yields a
more fine-grained and accurate understanding of emotions’ intentionality and their roles
in social contexts than the insistence on a purely mind-to-world direction of fit.
Keywords: emotions, action, philosophy of emotions, philosophy of mind, cognitive science
INTRODUCTION
Emotions are naturally social phenomena. Not only do emotions most commonly occur in social
contexts, but they are mostly reactions to other people (Parkinson, 1995; Clark et al., 1996, p. 247),
are expressed toward other people (Buss, 1992; Baumeister et al., 1994; Fischer and Roseman, 2007)
and regulated by relations with other people (Brody and Hall, 2008). Further, a social setting is
necessary for several emotions to arise in the first place, suggesting an inherently social quality of
emotions. For instance, shame, envy, guilt, embarrassment, contempt, love, and hatred all require
third parties as causes, targets, or observers in order for these emotions to occur in the first place.
Thus, studying emotions in social contexts appears vital to understanding the nature of emotions
and any adequate concept of emotions should be applicable to social contexts.
Surprisingly, the dependence of emotions on social contexts is often neglected in emotion
research. On the empirical front, emotions are often studied in a laboratory setting by measuring
subjects’ reactions to pictures of stimuli such as spiders or snakes (Fischer and van Kleef, 2010),
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and, on the theoretical front, emotions are usually construed
as representations of an object’s value in some form or another
(de Sousa, 2004, p. 61). While in the philosophy of emotions
these representations may come in form of judgments of value
and importance (Nussbaum, 2004, p. 183), reactions to known
values (Mulligan, 2009) or attitudes toward an object exhibiting
certain evaluative properties (Deonna and Teroni, 2012, p. 76),
psychologists regard an emotion as the process of appraising a
stimulus’ significance to a subject, either according to various
aspects of the stimulus’ properties (such as Scherer’s, 2001,
stimulus evaluation checks) or as the manifestation of a fixed
set of “core relational themes” (Lazarus, 1991; Prinz, 2004).
Seemingly all these approaches attempt to explain emotions
independently of any social dimension to emotions. Rather,
emotions’ function to represent values is assumed to be more
fundamental to an emotion than any social functions they might
have, so that the social dimension of emotions is considered
secondary or even negligible (Fischer and van Kleef, 2010).
Further, as representations of value, on both philosophical
and psychological emotion theories emotions are regarded as
cognitions, in the sense that their intentionality has a mind-
to-world direction of fit rather than a world-to-mind direction
of fit1. Sometimes emotions are even explicitly denied any
world-to-mind direction of fit (Döring, 2007, p. 384; Mulligan,
2007, p. 210–211; Deonna and Teroni, 2012, p. 83). Although
the construal of emotions as evaluations (qua mind-to-world
directed cognitions) is often befitting, it disregards emotions’
motivational nature that leads to action (Scarantino, 2014,
p. 156), i.e., the world-to-mind directed aspect of emotions’
intentionality.
In social contexts the world-to-mind direction of fit of
emotions’ intentionality can hardly be denied. It seems self-
evident that emotions occurring in social environments are
ways of responding to and interacting with other social
members. Hereby the relation between a social stimulus and
an individual is not unidirectional, as the insistence on a
purely mind-to-world direction of fit would imply. Instead,
since social interactions necessarily entail that two or more
social members act on and influence one another, an emotional
individual influences the very stimulus of his emotion during
such interactions. Thus, an emotion occurring in a social
context is not a private and internal state that is triggered
by a static stimulus in an individual, as a mind-to-world
directed evaluative representation would imply (Parkinson,
1995; Parkinson et al., 2005). Rather, since the emotional
stimuli are other social members’ behaviors or emotions,
which are subject to ongoing change and can be influenced,
the relationship between individual and stimulus is dynamic
and bidirectional (Fischer and van Kleef, 2010). Hence, in
addition to the social environment impressing itself on the
1In this paper Velleman (1992, p. 8) definitions of the two directions of fit
will be taken as a guideline. That is, in mind-world directed intentional states
a proposition is “grasped as patterned after the world,” i.e., as something true,
whereas in world-mind directed states a proposition is “grasped as a pattern for
the world to follow,” i.e., regarded as something to be brought about or to be made
true. The former are referred to as cognitions while the latter are termed conations.
individual—which constitutes the often mentioned mind-to-
world directedness—, so too the individual acts on his
environment through his emotion—suggesting a simultaneous
world-to-mind directedness of emotions. Another feature of
emotions’ world-to-mind direction of fit that is best highlighted
in social contexts is that emotions are not always responses to
stimuli but can also initiate socio-emotional interactions. That is,
emotions in social contexts are not merely re-actions to stimuli
but often also actions on others. Given the pronounced world-
to-mind directedness of emotions in social contexts, construing
emotions essentially or only as representations of value appears
inadequate.
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate emotions’ world-
to-mind directedness and to show how it contributes to
understanding emotions in social contexts. It shall become
evident that acknowledging the world-to-mind direction of fit
of emotions’ intentionality has many explanatory advantages,
such as accounting for context sensitivities, variations in emotion
expression or the assessment of an emotion’s appropriateness.
To highlight the world-to-mind direction of fit of emotions’
intentionality, the main concern will be to construe emotions
as forms of action. Although the idea that emotions are action-
oriented in nature is itself not new (cf., e.g., Scarantino,
2014), this article attempts to provide a novel insight into the
active dimension of emotions by analogizing emotions to two
kinds of action that have been distinguished in a different
context by Kirsh and Maglio (1994): pragmatic and epistemic
actions. Pragmatic actions are defined as transformations of
the physical or social space in order to achieve a certain
goal state in the world (ibid, p. 515), which amounts to
that what is usually associated with the term “action.” Kirsh
and Maglio’s more innovative contribution to cognitive science
is the identification of so-called epistemic actions. These are
defined as physical actions that uncover information which is
hidden or hard to compute mentally (ibid, pp. 513-4). Epistemic
actions have the goal to change a system’s computational
state rather than the state of the world. As will be shown,
emotions in social contexts often perform exactly those functions
defined for pragmatic and epistemic actions. That is, emotions
are often aimed at achieving certain goals within a social
context, meaning that they resemble pragmatic actions, and
in other cases emotions can be plausibly construed as acts of
probing the social environment in order to uncover important
information, thus complying with the functions of epistemic
actions. The construal of emotions as either pragmatic or
epistemic actions will reveal that the identification of emotions
with representations of value, and therefore as mental states
with only a mind-to-world direction of fit, is ill-fitting (pun
intended) to adequately capture the intentionality of emotions.
As forms of actions, emotions are consequently not only
evaluative representations of a state of affairs in the world, but
also comprise a directive aspect in their intentionality, so that
emotions are best understood as active engagements with one’s
social environment. The extent to which these contributions
matter for emotion theories will become evident during the
discussion of possible objections to the proposed rendition of
emotions as actions.
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EMOTIONS AS PRAGMATIC ACTIONS
One indication that a mind-to-world directedness of emotions’
intentionality alone is insufficient to account for emotions arising
in social situations, is given by the significantly different ways
in which a social context determines an individual’s emotional
reactions. That is, not only the type of emotion but also the
extent to and way in which an emotion is expressed appears to
depend on factors of the social situation in which the emotion
occurs. Sadness and guilt, for example, predominantly occur
when the emotional individual is among people he or she is
intimate with, while it is rarely observed when an individual is
among strangers (Buss, 1992; Baumeister et al., 1994). Similarly,
joy is preponderantly expressed when the emotional individual is
among affiliates and people with whom she wishes to consolidate
her affiliative bonds (Parkinson et al., 2005, p. 162; Griffiths and
Scarantino, 2009). Conversely, angry individuals tend to express
their anger mostly toward people of lower social status, especially
when the individuals think they can correct the behavior of the
other person and have power or control over the other (Fischer
and Roseman, 2007, p. 104). In these examples the idea that
emotions are evaluations of objects or events and hence have
only a mind-to-world direction of fit is difficult to fathom: For
instance, it is not apparent why a particular object or event
would be ascribed those evaluative properties that correspond
with sadness when one is among friends but not when one is
among strangers. The same holds for joy. Likewise, what relative
social status an individual has should not impact the evaluation of
a stimulus per se, so that the stimulus’ evaluation leads to anger in
one case but not the other. Instead, the close relation between the
occurrent emotions and the nature of the social contexts in which
they arise rather reflect an important function of emotions on the
interpersonal level, namely to influence social relations according
to an interpersonal motive (Fischer and Manstead, 2008, p. 458).
Hence, the observable context dependencies are not only the
consequence of an object’s represented evaluative properties, but
the result of the difference in afforded possibilities for interacting
with or acting on one’s environment, thus indicating a world-to-
mind direction of fit.
Diverging from most psychological and philosophical
emotion theories that regard emotions essentially as
representations of value, social psychologists often study
emotions in terms of the functions they perform in social
contexts (cf, e.g., Parkinson, 1995; Clark et al., 1996; Parkinson
et al., 2005; Fischer and Manstead, 2008). That is, emotions are
considered to be ways of achieving social goals by configuring or
altering one’s standing and one’s relations within a social group
(Fischer and Manstead, 2008, p. 457). Sadness, for example, is
a sign to others that one is vulnerable and in need of support,
thereby serving an affiliative function, especially when crying
is involved. In contrast, fear aims at putting distance between
oneself and others, thereby serving a distancing function. Anger,
in turn, serves the purpose of imposing change upon another
person’s attitude or behavior, so that, e.g., a threatening gesture
to someone can make that someone back off or telling off a friend
because he is late for an appointment is meant to make him not
be late again (ibid, p. 458).
Explicating emotions in terms of their functions implies
that emotions are ways of attaining certain goals or bringing
about certain effects in an individual’s social environment, i.e.,
they are world-to-mind directed in their intentionality. This
description of emotions coincides neatly with the definition of
pragmatic actions offered by Kirsh and Maglio (1994, p. 515):
transformations in a physical or social space to advance toward
a certain goal state. The construal of emotions as pragmatic
actions offers a plausible and significantly different perspective
on emotions in social situations than the typical contention
that emotions are essentially evaluations of objects or events.
It further provides straightforward explanations of emotion
processes where the typical characterization of emotion fails or
at least has some difficulty to do so. This shall become evident in
the following discussion of examples. In particular, the proposal
that emotions are pragmatic actions will be substantiated by
showing that emotions may be seen as pragmatic actions with
either short- or long-term goals. That is, the goal state which
pragmatic actions are aimed at can either be an immediate effect
of a pragmatic action or lie at the end of a series of pragmatic
actions (ibid.), and emotions in social contexts too can serve
either immediate pragmatic purposes or they can be elements in
a long-term strategy of relationship configuration.
Emotions as Pragmatic Actions with
Short-term Goals
Already above the descriptions of some social functions of
emotions revealed that the emotion which an individual exhibits
in a given social context can yield certain behavioral effects from
other social members. For example, an individual can try to get
needed support by exhibiting sadness or change the behavior of
his vis-à-vis through anger. Here emotions are direct functions
of what an emotional individual can achieve with that emotion
in the social situation. An exemplary study of such direct effects
yielded through emotions is one by Stein et al. (1993), where
subjects were asked to describe situations in which they had
become angry. It was found that whether a perceived loss elicits
anger or sadness depended on subjects’ prospects of obtaining
compensation in the remembered situation. These findings are
inexplicable if anger were merely the evaluation that one has
been wronged, but intelligible if anger is seen as a strategy to
elicit a certain reaction in others. Viewing emotions as strategies
of relationship configuration (Parkinson, 1995, p. 295), explains
why an individual should become upset in one way and not
another: anger and sadness serve very different social goals and
an emotional individual will react with that behavioral strategy
which is most likely to achieve the desired goal.
The pragmatic function of an emotion may vary within one
and the same emotion kind, so that there is not necessarily
a one-to-one mapping from emotion kind to social function.
To see this, consider an aggressive reaction vs. sulking in
response to an insult. According to most emotion theories, both
are manifestations of anger, since in both cases an event is
evaluated as an offense, or, according to appraisal theories, as
motivationally incongruent. But although the evaluation may
be the same in either case, all other aspects of the emotion
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 October 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1593
Wilutzky Emotions as pragmatic and epistemic actions
(e.g., expression, feeling, physiological responses) differ vastly.
So, a reference to the evaluative content alone cannot explain
why anger should manifest itself in such very different ways.
When construed as pragmatic actions though, a distinctive
difference between aggression and sulking quickly becomes
apparent: Whereas, the former is a brusque attempt to interrupt
the happenings of a situation, the latter is a denial of all social
transactions until appropriate concessions are obtained (Griffiths
and Scarantino, 2009, p. 440). Strategic concerns (e.g., whether or
not compensation can be obtained) or the effects of and on one’s
social standing (e.g., is the behavior compatible with one’s social
standing or will it cause others to regard one in a lower social
status) will play a decisive role in determining how an individual
will react emotionally. These aspects are missed if emotions are
equated with evaluative representations only. Acknowledging
that emotions are aimed at certain social goals therefore makes
more aspects of emotions and their intentionality intelligible,
than when they are reduced to evaluative representations with
only a mind-to-world direction of fit.
Another example of an immediate purpose emotions may
serve is their communicative function which was studied in
an experimental set-up devised to investigate embarrassment
(Leary et al., 1996). In this study, subjects were asked to
record a karaoke-style performance of a notoriously cheesy
love-song under two different conditions: In one condition,
the experimenter who recorded the performance signaled to
the participant that he was aware of the embarrassing nature
of the task and had registered their discomfort; in the other,
the experimenter made no such sympathetic indications. The
recordings of participants’ performances as well as a subsequently
administered questionnaire were analyzed to determine the levels
of the participants’ expressed and experienced embarrassment
over the task. The data revealed that subjects both showed and
reported less embarrassment in the first condition, where they
were given reason to believe the experimenter sympathized with
them, than in the second condition. Since the target object
remained identical in the two conditions (participants were given
the same task to perform), the researchers concluded that, rather
than only reaction to their evaluation of the task, the participants’
embarrassment functioned as means to communicate to the
experimenter their low opinion of the song they were singing and
their desire to conform to community standards. In other words,
the interpretation of the findings offered by the study’s authors
suggests that emotions have a pragmatic nature and hence a
world-to-mind direction of fit.
Granted, the results of this study do not necessarily rule
out the possibility that emotions are representations of value.
Arguably, participants’ evaluations of the situation may have
been contextually richer than merely the representation of the
task’s properties in isolation. For instance, whether or not
participants were aware of the experimenter’s knowledge of their
embarrassment for performing the task may have been included
in their evaluative representation of the situation. That is, the
observed variance in embarrassment could have been the result
of a difference in the way the situation was represented after all.
Yet, albeit not an outright refutation of the construal of emotions
as evaluative representations, the study’s findings are much
more easily and more parsimoniously explained by ascribing a
communicative function to emotions. To see this, consider how
the interpretation offered by Leary and colleagues immediately
addresses the expressive aspects of an emotion and the effects
these may have on a situation. In the explication of emotions as
pragmatic actions in social contexts these aspects come as part
and parcel of an emotion, since it is through the expression of an
emotion that an individual interacts with her social environment
and achieves a desired change in the social space. In contrast,
the construal of emotions as evaluative representations requires
a separate account of how an evaluative representation leads
to a certain expression of the emotion, while the effects of the
expression are seemingly ignored completely. Thus, given the
advantage of a more comprehensive while simultaneously also
parsimonious account, viewing emotions as pragmatic actions
and thereby having a world-to-mind direction of fit appears to be
the more favorable explanation of this experiment’s data than the
idea that emotions are evaluative representations with a strictly
mind-to-world direction of fit.
Emotions as Pragmatic Actions with
Long-term Goals
Aside from the just portrayed immediate effects of emotions
in social situations, emotions can also serve to achieve long-
term goals for an individual’s social relations. Similarly as in the
cases just described, where exhibiting one emotion instead of
another aims at a certain short-term goal, long-term effects of
emotions on social relations can be achieved by the same means.
Illustrating this is a study on anger vs. contempt, in which these
sometimes conflated emotions are characterized as decisively
different, not only in terms of their expressions and physiological
characteristics, but especially in their social functions (Fischer
and Roseman, 2007). The authors of the study found that whether
subjects react to someone’s action with anger or contempt
involves more than finding the other blameworthy or perceiving
an offense in the other’s behavior (i.e., the evaluation of that
behavior with only a mind-to-world directed content). Whether
subjects reacted with contempt or anger correlated significantly
with the desired long-term effects that emotion would have
on the interpersonal relationship in question: Whereas anger is
characterized by a short-term attack response but has the effect of
long-term reconciliation, contempt is characterized by rejection
and social exclusion in both the short and long term (ibid, p.
103). Thus, again, the difference in the emotional reaction cannot
be the result of the evaluation of a presented stimulus alone,
but must rather be ascribed to pragmatic factors in the subjects’
strategies for long-term relationship configuration.
On a different note, consider those emotions that are
intrinsically long-term phenomena, such as love, hate, grief,
resentment, or jealousy. These emotions necessarily persist over
a longer period of time. It would, for instance, be questionable
to claim that a person loved someone, but did so only for the
duration of a few minutes. This may be infatuation, interest,
or a crush, but, as the late Solomon argued (Solomon, 2007,
p. 194), love needs to be cultivated and is a process which
consists in several choices and actions made over a longer
course of time. This rich notion of love conforms with the
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folk-psychological concept of love, and, arguably, any viable
emotion theory should account for it, if the theory’s explanandum
is to resemble that which any lay person understands by
the term instead of some artificially constructed concept. But
this notion of love has proven difficult to square with many
emotion theories. Especially for psychological emotion theories
the question how to accommodate long-term emotions into their
theoretical framework poses a problem, since here emotions
are often explicitly defined as short-lived episodes (cf., Scherer,
2001). Some proposals of what long-term emotions such as love
are, include mental attitudes toward certain objects (Deonna
and Teroni, 2012) or dispositions to undergo particular kinds
of short-lived emotion episodes (Scherer, 2001). However,
these attempts at making long-term emotions intelligible are
unsatisfactory on two fronts: First, they treat long-term emotions
as a different kind of phenomenon than short-term emotions,
since long-term emotions are ascribed to a different ontological
category. As pointed out above, such a stark deviation from
the folk-psychological concepts of emotions, where long-term
emotions such as love and hate are equally commonplace
examples of emotions as fear or anger, runs the risk of changing
the explanandum of emotion theories to some artificial construct.
Second, from the equation of a long-term emotion with an
attitude or disposition to undergo certain emotion episodes, it
follows that an individual may have a long-term emotion without
that emotion necessarily ever having to be instantiated. That is, it
is possible for person A to love person B, meaning that A has the
disposition to undergo certain emotion episodes upon meeting
B, but A may not ever meet B. So, although A may have the
disposition to love B, A may never actually experience an episode
in which that love is instantiated. At the very least, this possibility
of loving someone, in the sense that one has a disposition or
attitude of a certain kind, but without ever experiencing or
instantiating that love is very odd. It remains to be concluded that
many standard emotion theories have difficulties accounting for
long-term emotions.
In contrast, when explicating social emotions as ways of
relationship configuration it becomes obvious that the object
of study can be itself a long-term phenomenon, namely
the interpersonal relationship and the changes it undergoes.
Moreover, when emotions in social contexts are explicated as
kinds of pragmatic actions on an interpersonal relation, this
directly opens up the possibility to construe long-term emotions
as a series of individual actions which are all aimed at one
particular goal of relationship configuration. This is entailed
by Kirsh and Maglio’s definition of pragmatic actions, where
the goal of the action can also lie at the end of a series of
actions (Kirsh and Maglio, 1994, p. 515). Just like the act of
getting a beer from the fridge may consist in several individual
steps (like getting up, walking into the kitchen, opening the
fridge etc.), the act of loving someone may consist in a number
of emotional episodes (like being happy upon seeing them,
sad when they leave, afraid when they are in danger etc.).
This possibility to account for long-term emotions with the
same explanatory tool as for short-term emotions, i.e., as goal-
directed actions, provides a compellingly parsimonious account
of emotions. Also, the idea that an emotion is aimed at a
long-term goal of relationship configuration and every action
toward this long-term goal therefore constitutes that one and the
same emotion, bars the odd possibility of having a disposition
or attitude of a long-term emotion, without ever experiencing
that emotion, as discussed above. Furthermore, the idea that
single emotion episodes constitute an overarching long-term
emotion just as single actions constitute a complex action,
offers a phenomenologically plausible description of the relation
between a long-term emotion and the single emotion episodes
that constitute it. That is, a long-term emotion such as love or
hate or jealousy manifests itself and is experienced in the single
emotion episodes constituting it, such as the sadness over a loved
one’s departure, the joy over one’s enemy’s downfall or the anger
over an adversary’s advances. These individual emotion episodes
are not prompted by the long-term emotion, in the sense that
they are effects of a distinct cause, but the long-term emotion
simply consists in these single emotion episodes and are also
experienced as such2. Relatedly, Helm (2002, p. 22) describes how
a mode of caring results in a rational pattern of emotions with
a common focus, so that certain ways of caring commit one to
a set of emotions, feelings and desires in situations concerning
the focus. Caring about someone or something therefore
simply is to have certain emotional experiences toward that
object.
In sum, the construal of short- and long-term emotions as
pragmatic actions offers a significantly different perspective on
emotions from the approach of most emotion theories to view
emotions as mind-to-world directed evaluative representations.
As shown, by taking into consideration how emotions are aimed
at goal states in social contexts, instances of both short- and
long-term emotions can be made intelligible which the usual
approaches have difficulties accounting for or can give only
cumbersome explanations. Also, not only did treating emotions
as pragmatic actions in social contexts produce parsimonious
explanations in the individually discussed cases, but, overall, the
fact that both short- and long-term emotions can be fittingly
described with one and the same explanatory tool yields a concise
and sparse account of emotions on varying time-frames—
something the standard construal of emotions as evaluative
representations founders on. Finally, the idea that single emotion
episodes are all part of one overarching long-term emotion, just
like single pragmatic acts can be part of one complex action,
seems to be in accord with the general phenomenality of such
emotional occurrences.
EMOTIONS AS EPISTEMIC ACTIONS
The unique contribution which Kirsh and Maglio’s article (Kirsh
and Maglio, 1994) made to cognitive science, and which has
thus far not been related to the philosophy of emotions, is the
insight that not all actions are necessarily pragmatic in their
function. That is, some actions, rather than being directly aimed
2I am indebted to one ofmy reviewers for prompting these considerations, and also
for pointing out that similar ideas were much more carefully already developed by
Aristotle in his contemplations concerning the concept of hexis, i.e., our tendencies
to form or shape our emotions through actions. For a succinct and comprehensive
summary and discussion, see Slaby and Wüschner (2014).
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at changing the world so that it conforms to a particular goal
state, are performed to uncover information that is hidden
or to simplify an agent’s problem-solving task. These actions
serve an epistemic function instead of a pragmatic one (ibid,
p. 513). As an example of epistemic actions Kirsh and Maglio
focus primarily on Tetris-players’ habit to physically rotate the
appearing blocks to determine where they would best be placed,
instead of performing this rotation mentally. Other examples
include gathering information about the environment through
exploration, like when scouting unfamiliar terrain in order to
determine where to set up camp, or using one’s environment
to simplify a cognitive task, like when arranging mechanical
pieces in a particular order to determine how to assemble them
(ibid, p. 515). All these are “ways an agent has of modifying the
external environment to provide crucial bits of information just
when they are needed most” (ibid, p. 542). Importantly though,
the changes made in the environment in order to achieve the
desired epistemic state are not the goal of the epistemic action.
This is the critical point in which epistemic actions differ from
pragmatic actions: Unlike pragmatic actions, epistemic actions
are not aimed at changing the world to be a certain way, but
are aimed at achieving an epistemic state for the cognitive system
(ibid, p. 514).
This places epistemic actions in an odd place between world-
to-mind and mind-to-world direction of fit: On the one hand,
they are actions, meaning they are performed transformations
of physical or social space in order to achieve a certain goal or
purpose. As actions they (should) have a world-to-mind direction
of fit. Yet, unlike pragmatic actions, the goal of epistemic
actions does not lie in bringing about a change in the world,
but rather in altering one’s epistemic state. That is, epistemic
actions are not world-to-mind directed in the sense that they
are aimed at bringing about a particular state of the world that
ought to obtain. On the other hand, epistemic actions result in
epistemic states, which are mind-to-world directed. However,
epistemic actions do not have a mind-to-world direction of
fit either because, albeit they disclose facts about the world,
they do not, strictly speaking, represent these. Yet, despite the
difficulty to classify epistemic actions using the typical categories
of intentional states’ direction of fit, they should nonetheless be
regarded as intentional states of some kind, since they are skilled
or intelligent forms of interacting with the world. Rather than
having neither direction of fit, epistemic actions seem to have
both3.
What might shed some light on the nature of epistemic
actions’ intentionality concerning the conundrum about their
direction of fit, is to frame the matter in terms of their fulfillment
and correctness conditions: Since epistemic actions aim at
providing facts, it appears to be their fulfillment condition to
establish the truth values and correctness conditions of a state
of affairs in the world. In other words, epistemic actions are
world-to-mind directed processes aimed at bringing about mind-
to-world directed states.
3In this respect epistemic actions resemble Millikan’s (1995) pushmi-pullyu
representations, which are also both directive and descriptive but without being
only the one or the other.
The unique intentional nature of epistemic actions can
be used to capture aspects of emotions’ intentionality in
social interactions that are often overlooked. For, emotional
interactions with others too can be understood as probing for
certain information that becomes central to the unfolding of an
emotion process. This probing does not necessarily require a
premeditated hypothesis that is deliberately tested, but can be a
very simple behavioral mechanism similar to ones observed in
animals. A suitable example is provided by the ethologist Hinde’s
(1985) observation of birds issuing threat responses toward
approaching opponents. The threat signal bears all characteristics
of anger, yet in most cases the birds flee after issuing it.
Statistically, the issued threat signal is thus rather an indication
of a fear reaction. To resolve this bifurcation, Hinde proposes
that the bird’s issued threat response is rather a way of testing
its opponent’s intentions and power, i.e., the bird probes whether
its rival is at all interested in attacking or whether he can easily
be made to back off. Likewise, dogs often bark fiercely at an
approaching opponent, i.e., display anger, only to demonstrate
submissiveness shortly afterwards if their opponent proves to be
more dominant. In both examples, the initial emotional reaction
is a way for the animal to probe the situational conditions and
the gathered information helps determine its future actions. In
other words, the animal performs an epistemic action and from
the newly attained epistemic state, its subsequent emotional
reactions ensue. Importantly, the further development of the
emotion process depends on the information acquired through
the epistemic action (e.g., if the bird discovered that his threats
were effective, it would not flee in fear but continue with its
display of anger, or the dog would not cease to display threats
if they proved effective in intimidating its opponent).
Analogous behaviors can be observed in humans’ interactions
with one another. Continuing with the example of anger, an
individual may, after receiving a possibly threatening cue from
another person, ask somewhat aggressively, “What’s that?” or
“What do you want?,” with the corresponding posture (e.g., raised
chin, protruded chest), facial expression (e.g., narrowed eyes,
tight jaw) or gesture. This emotional signal serves to retrieve
more information about the other’s intentions and the situation,
i.e., it has an epistemic function. Although the individual who
reacts in this way is signaling a readiness to respond angrily just
in case the other’s action was in fact meant as an offense, the
development of the emotion process remains to be determined
and depends fully on the other’s “reply” to one’s “question.”
That is, depending on the information that is retrieved by one’s
probing action, one may immediately cease to be angry (e.g., if
the other were to clarify that he had no offending intentions in
mind), become afraid (e.g., if the other were to respond even
more forcefully) or the anger may persist (e.g., if the other
were to continue with his behavior). Further examples of human
probing behavior are pouting, teasing, sulking, and sometimes
also smiling. In each of these conducts emotions like sadness,
contempt, anger, and joy, respectively, are employed to probe
one’s social environment, i.e., to test another person’s reaction
and see what possibilities the situation affords. Relatedly, Griffiths
and Scarantino (2009) portray emotions in social contexts as
possible forms of negotiations, an idea they adapt from Hinde’s
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work on emotion expression in animals and humans. Although
emotional behaviors can be expressions of an inner psychological
state, often times emotional behavior is rather aimed at gathering
feedback from one’s social environment. In the latter case, the
emotional signals produced by an individual are intentionally
ambiguous, so that the outcome of the social transaction remains
open ended and depends crucially on the recipient’s response
(ibid, p. 446). Many emotional signals that are sent in social
interactions are hence aimed at uncovering information and,
therefore, arguably epistemic actions.
Clearly, this rendition of emotions operating as epistemic
actions runs contrary to the idea that emotions are
representations of value, which would require an already
established evaluation of the situation. Yet, from the fact that an
evaluation is not yet fixed when the social environment is probed
with an emotion, it must not follow that these instances of
emotion are devoid of all value-related content. For, even though
the situation’s value may not yet be established, the emotion qua
epistemic action is aimed at discovering the correct evaluation
of the situation and thereby still concerns the situation’s value.
Such probing for the evaluative quality of a social stimulus by
actively engaging with it bears several advantages over the view
that the evaluation of a social stimulus is determinately fixed at
the outset of an emotion process. First, it simply requires less
cognitive capacities to probe for information at that moment
when it is needed, than to acquire and represent all details in
advance or to arrive at the relevant information through costly
internal computations (Noë, 2004; Clark, 2008). Furthermore,
seeing that the objects which emotions in social contexts are
directed at are other people, the objects of emotions are subject
to ongoing change. Thus, in order for emotional interactions to
be successful the information they rely on must be continuously
updated. Often the temporal dynamics of social interactions
and emotions transpire on the scale of milliseconds, so that
an immediate uptake of information is crucial. For example,
a fleeting facial expression may matter significantly to the
unfolding of an interaction between two people (Ekman, 2003).
Finally, epistemic actions can be performed repeatedly, so that a
cognizer’s epistemic state is continually updated (like repeatedly
touching an object that is being heated in order to determine
whether it has reached the desired temperature yet). In the
case of emotions, this allows for a fine-tuned specification of
a situation’s or event’s evaluative nature and minimizes errors
in evaluative assessments. In sum, continuously probing for or
otherwise exploring a situation’s meaning or another person’s
intent through epistemic actions is not only an efficient and
computationally undemanding way of making information
available to cognitive processes like emotions, but, because the
acquired information is immediate and continually updated, it
is also bound to yield very accurate assessments and successful
emotional interactions. Standard emotion theories miss out on
these advantages by ignoring the dynamic nature of emotion
processes and insisting instead that an evaluative representation
of a situation must be fully established first in order for an
emotion to occur.
It is worth contemplating further the importance of probing
for the correct evaluation of a situation and allowing for an
emotion to develop with every acquired information-update.
It is these dynamic features of emotion processes which enable
the richness, complexity, and fineness of our social interactions.
If it were necessary for an evaluation of a situation to be
fully established and settled on at the outset of an emotion
process already, thus barring the possibility of making further
inquiries and amending one’s evaluation accordingly, this would
leave very little room for fine social interactions and lead to
rather primitive behaviors instead. In fact, a lack of explorative
abilities and flexibility in emotional processes characterizes
many affective disorders, such as anger or anxiety disorders,
problems with anger management, phobias, and mania. It also
undermines the possibility of being attuned to one’s social
concomitants’ emotions and thereby prohibits important
emotional mechanisms in social conduct, like empathy. Hence,
it is a significant feature of social and emotional intelligence not
to be too rigid in emotional interactions, but rather allow for
evaluations to be searched for or inquired after, thus leaving room
for emotions to unfold dynamically. Yet, acknowledging the
importance of an adaptable evaluative content that is susceptible
to new information clashes with the typically discussed themes
in cognitive emotion theories, which comprise the irrationality
of emotions and emotions’ resistance to judgments or
beliefs.
Recognizing that emotions are first and foremost social
phenomena and embedded in the social contexts in which they
arise debunks the understanding of emotions as singular and
detached representations of an event’s evaluative properties,
which, once cast, remain unchanged (Fischer and van Kleef,
2010, p. 209). Rather, a system of reciprocal causation or
dynamic coupling is created between an individual and his
social environment through ongoing emotional interaction
(Griffiths and Scarantino, 2009, p. 445–446). Emotions may be
understood as means by which an individual can interact with
her social environment, and this bidirectional nature of emotions’
intentional structure in social contexts is fittingly captured by
epistemic actions, as is their adaptable evaluative content.
ANTICIPATION OF OBJECTIONS AND
DISCUSSION
It is to be expected that the made proposal to construe emotions
as pragmatic or epistemic actions will run into opposition at
several points. This section aims at anticipating three such
objections and to provide counterarguments and clarifications in
order to avert these. In doing so, the consequences for ongoing
theorizing about emotions shall become evident.
One objection to be expected is that the described cases of
emotions as pragmatic or epistemic actions are not genuine
emotions. That is, although it may be granted that the performed
actions in the given examples are aimed at achieving certain
pragmatic or epistemic goals, the described behaviors are only
pretenses of emotions to reach that goal and not sincere
emotional reactions to the situation’s evaluative properties.
Especially the referral to emotions as strategies may imply that
feigning an emotion is simply part of an agent’s deliberate plan.
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However, the purposefulness of emotions must not be the
product of a premeditated and deliberate strategy. In both the
renditions of emotions as epistemic and pragmatic actions,
the emotions are immediate and intuitive reactions to the
social dynamics of a situation, for some of which there
exist homologous animal behaviors. The social dimension is a
fundamental element in the emotion process, so that the social
effects of emotions are available to individuals without involving
any premeditated planning (Fischer and van Kleef, 2010, p. 208–
209). Thus, the observed emotional reactions are rather the
effects of very basic and inherent processes rather than deliberate
and intentional plans. Relatedly, as Griffiths (2004) has argued,
emotions track possibilities for interactions. That is, emotions
can simultaneously be the assessment of a situation’s meaning as
well as an intention to act a certain way. This is so because the
significance of a stimulus situation is not only evaluated in terms
of what has happened, but also in terms of what will happen if
the emotion is produced. Hence, an intention to act is an inherent
part of an emotion’s evaluative intentionality and not a derivation
from a separate evaluative representation. In sum, the fact that
emotions can be purposeful social interactions need not imply
that they are deliberate pretenses.
A related objectionmay be that the discussed examples are not
genuine instances of emotions but only expressions of emotions
or other forms of bodily reactions. Concerning those emotions
that were presented as pragmatic actions, it may be called
into question whether the behavior that serves the pragmatic
function really is part of the emotion itself and not just a
behavior caused by the emotion. In other words, the difference
in observed expressions of emotion in the discussed cases are
just that: differences in expression, but not necessarily differences
in emotion. Similarly, the epistemic actions that are performed
to probe for a situation’s value may have the appearance of
emotional behaviors, but are not actually emotions. On this
objection, both in the case of pragmatic and epistemic actions, the
bodily behavior or expression which may look like an emotion,
is considered to be clearly distinct from the actual emotion itself.
Such a segregation of the bodily and cognitive aspects of emotions
is often found in philosophical cognitivist position on emotions
(cf., e.g., Solomon, 1976; Nussbaum, 2004; Döring, 2007), where
the evaluative content of an emotion is regarded as the defining
feature of an emotion, while the bodily aspects are considered
secondary or even negligible.
Clearly, this objection is a disagreement over how to define
the term “emotion.” While many (mostly philosophical) theories
presuppose a certain intentional structure with an evaluative
content as the defining mark of emotions, there are also strong
arguments in favor of the position that behaviors which exhibit
all essential physiological characteristics of emotions deserve to
be called emotion. For instance, affect program or basic emotion
theories, both of which stress the evolutionary continuity of
emotions in a Darwinian tradition (e.g., Ekman, 2003), would
regard the behavioral aspect as equally, if not even more, crucial
to identifying emotions as the intentional structure. Also among
contemporary appraisal theorists criteria such as motivational
force, activation of somatovisceral and motor systems, as well
as attentional and organismic control precedence are recognized
as equally defining features of emotions as the appraisal of a
stimulus (cf. Frijda and Scherer, 2009, p. 143–144)4. The idea
of an emotion devoid of any physiological arousal or bodily
expression and a biased insistence on a particular intentional
structure as the sole definitive mark of emotions instead, appears
to be a disjointed notion of philosophical cognitivism. Thus, such
an approach leads to a scientifically isolated position. Moreover,
as pointed out in the discussion of emotions as pragmatic
actions, any approach that treats the emotion expression as
separate from the emotion owes an additional explanation
of how corresponding expressions of emotion are produced.
An emotion theory which incorporates the expressive aspects
of an emotion from the outset, therefore fares better with
respect to parsimony and completeness. Lastly, the segregation
of the emotion’s expression from the emotion itself simply is
phenomenologically implausible. That is, the bodily changes take
place and are experienced throughout an emotion are just as
much part and parcel of the intentional structure of an emotion
as any other intentional content (cf. Goldie, 2000).
A third possible objection is that, even if the depicted
emotional reactions were genuine, they would be incorrect
or inappropriate because they misrepresent the situation’s
evaluative properties. It is a key feature of many emotion theories
to assume that emotion types are individuated by their evaluative
contents, so that each type of emotion corresponds to one
certain evaluative content, either in form of a formal object, core
relational theme or appraisal pattern (cf., e.g., de Sousa, 1987,
p. 20; Prinz, 2004; Deonna and Teroni, 2012, p. 41). Anger,
for instance, is individuated through the evaluative content of
a slight or offense, a demeaning offense against me or what is
mine, or a motivational incongruence for which another person
is accountable, respectively, and every instance of anger must
have this evaluative content, else it is incorrect and inappropriate
(cf., e.g., de Sousa, 1987, p. 108; Mulligan, 2007, p. 209; Deonna
and Teroni, 2012, p. 81). In the previous sections, the depicted
emotions’ types often did not correspond with their presupposed
evaluative contents (in the case of emotions as pragmatic actions,
e.g., whether anger or sadness arose depended on the emotional
individual’s possibilities for social interactions rather than the
evaluation of the stimulus event as an offense) or they lacked
a proper evaluative content altogether (in the case of emotions
as epistemic actions the evaluation of the stimulus situation still
remained to be determined). Therefore, it may be argued that
these emotional reactions are incorrect and inappropriate for the
depicted situations.
Yet, the idea that the correctness or appropriateness of an
emotion can be assessed by whether or not it corresponds to
a particular sort of evaluation is questionable. It stems from
the presupposition that emotions are purely mind-to-world
4Note that there are about as many different appraisal theories as there are
theorists. However, there seems to have been a general tendency in the early
appraisal theories, such as those of Magda Arnold and Richard Lazarus, to regard
an emotion as the effect of an appraisal. That is, the bodily changes and action
tendencies were regarded as the proper constituents of the emotion, while the
cognitive appraisal was only a precursor to it. This indicates that in appraisal
theories too the physiological aspects of emotions are indisputably part and parcel
of an emotion process.
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directed and thereby have corresponding correctness conditions.
Conceding instead a world-to-mind direction of fit for emotions’
intentionality immediately results in different assessments of the
appropriateness of emotional reactions to stimulus situations—
ones which often seem more fitting and desirable. In the case
of emotions as pragmatic actions, for instance, recognizing
the world-to-mind direction of fit of emotions entails that the
appropriateness of the emotional reaction is assessed with regard
to the emotion’s pragmatic function. That is, whether or not a
certain emotion qua pragmatic action is appropriate depends
on whether the intended aim is appropriate and the means
by which it is achieved are socially adequate (cf. D’Arms and
Jacobson, 2000 or Wilutzky, submitted). Recall, for instance,
that the social function of anger is to cause someone to change
her behavior. Anger can be exhibited to this end without there
necessarily having been an offense, e.g., when scolding a child
for dangerous behavior or a football player’s reaction when being
tackled by a member of the rival team. In both situations the
occurring anger serves an appropriate purpose, i.e., protecting
the child from harm or intimidating the rival, and seems socially
adequate for the situation. The emotional reaction is by no
means incorrect or inappropriate. Rather, not exhibiting anger
in these cases would appear to be inappropriate. Concerning
emotions qua epistemic actions, as argued at the end of the
discussion of emotions as epistemic actions, searching for the
correct evaluation of a situation makes the richness and fineness
of our social interactions possible. Probing for and exploring the
correct evaluation of a situation is thus highly appropriate and
failing to do so can result in inappropriate and even pathological
behaviors. Hence, determining emotions’ appropriateness with
respect to their world-to-mind directedness instead of their
mind-to-world direction of fit yields assessments of their entire,
that is, also their moral and pragmatic, adequacy. In this light, the
emotions described in the previous sections are arguably correct
and appropriate ways of reacting to a situation.
One final clarification that may be in order, concerns the
different time-scales on which emotions transpire. Whereas
emotions were presented as long-term phenomena that may
persist over years when discussing emotions qua pragmatic
actions, it was pointed out that emotions may be quick and
immediate reactions to a situation when discussing emotions
qua epistemic actions. At first glance, these different temporal
characterizations appear contradictory, and, indeed, there seems
to be a related divide among emotion theories between those that
regard emotions as possibly complex cognitive phenomena and
those that study emotions as instantaneous basic and automatic
reactions to stimuli. However, for the above discussion of
emotions the variations in temporality do not necessarily present
a conflict. To the contrary, the varying temporal scales on which
emotions transpire underline the dynamic structure of emotional
engagements with the world previously argued for. As became
evident in the discussion of emotions as epistemic actions,
an emotion process may encompass several iterative probings
or other forms of repeated interaction with the environment.
Likewise, it was shown that an emotion qua pragmatic action
may either be aimed at an immediate goal of relationship
configuration or a long-term one, which in turn may consist in
several instances of emotions. Thus, an emotion may indeed be
a quick and immediate reaction in the realm of milliseconds.
Then, what is being referred to as “emotion” is one step in a
possibly temporally extended and iterative emotional interaction.
But emotions do not necessarily end after one single reaction to a
stimulus, as commonplace construals of emotions as evaluative
representations seem to imply. Since emotion processes can
encompass several iterations of a dynamic exchange between an
individual and her social environment, they may have a much
longer duration in total. Both temporal orders in which the
term emotion may be understood, that is, either as immediate
or continuous actions, can be addressed when the concepts of
pragmatic and epistemic actions are applied to emotions as
suggested above5.
CONCLUDING SUMMARY
The aim of this paper was to challenge the usual construal
of emotions’ intentionality as evaluative representations with
only a mind-to-world direction of fit and to promote instead
the alternative view that emotions often also exhibit a world-
to-mind direction of fit. To this end, different instances of
emotions in social settings were discussed. It was shown how
these can be construed as pragmatic or epistemic actions, and
that such construals bear several advantages over the prevalent
assumption that emotions may be equated with representations
of value: Seeing emotions as pragmatic actions highlights the
social functions emotions play in relationship configurations,
which can make differences in emotional reactions intelligible
that standard emotion theories have difficulties accounting for.
Also, the construal of emotions as pragmatic actions often yields
more parsimonious explanations of emotional processes, not
least because it is easily applicable to both short- and long-
term emotions. Understanding emotions as epistemic actions
further highlights the dynamic nature of emotions, consisting
in continuous interactions with the environment that allow
emotions to be adaptable, accurate, and fine-tuned engagements
with the world. Importantly, conceding that emotions can have
a world-to-mind directedness by no means entails that these
emotions are not genuine reactions to a situation or that they are
inappropriate.
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